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Abstract 
Religious plurality is a fact of our time. It cannot be avoided. Neither 
can it be factually acknowledged then cognitively shunned, except by 
enacting a most obtuse denial. Religious plurality demands a cognitive 
response. The pressing question is how to comprehend both other 
religions in themselves and, of course, reflect on what they mean in 
respect of comprehending one‟s own. If other religions are not to be 
denied, are they to be treated as equal? Do religions aspire to the same 
goal? Are they just varying paths with the same end? What is the nature 
of the reality embedded in the notion of religious plurality?  
 It is in response to issues such as these that the paradigm of 
pluralism has emerged to challenge not only any narrow exclusivism, 
but also the more subtle inclusivism where one religion is perceived to 
function as the dominant paradigm to which all others, in some sense, 
are subsumed. In this paper I shall briefly review, and critically discuss, 
the paradigm of religious pluralism with particular reference to the work 
of Peter Byrne with respect to referential realism.
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I 
Generally speaking, pluralism refers to the intellectual stance of embracing the 
fact of plurality and giving it a positive interpretation. Religious pluralism, as a 
conceptual construct, may be viewed on this basis as an assertion of a 
“measure of equal standing between the major religious traditions” at the very 
least. It certainly entails a denial of any type “of uniqueness and absoluteness 
claimed for one tradition or another”.3 Religious pluralism opens the way to 
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situating particular religious identity within a larger framework of 
understanding and knowledge. In this sense, pluralism is but “one important 
intellectual response to the fact of religious diversity”.4  
 The advocating of a paradigm of pluralism needs, of course, to be seen in 
the context of countering the alternate paradigms of exclusivism and 
inclusivism. The paradigm of exclusivism has to do with the material 
identification of a particular religion (or form of that religion) with the essence 
and substance of true universal religion as such, thereby excluding all other 
possibilities to that claim. From this viewpoint, the exclusivist‟s religion is the 
„Only Right One‟. For the exclusivist the mere co-existence of religions is not 
possible. Instead, the tendency to exclusive self-assertion predominates.  By 
contrast, inclusivism may be regarded as the effective identity of a particular 
religion with the universal, albeit with some allowance made for others within 
the predominating schema. That is to say, this paradigm suggests the „other‟ is 
included surreptitiously, by being understood, as already and „anonymously‟, 
indirectly within the fold of the „true religion‟ identified, of course, as being 
the religion of the proponent – the „Only Fully Right One‟. 
 The paradigms of exclusivism and inclusivism are both premised on the 
notion that there is but one universal truth or religion whereby the relationship 
between the universal and specific is problematic. Either way it is taken as a 
sine qua non of „universal‟ that there can be only one valid expression of it in 
terms of particular form. Thus the religious exclusivist makes an assumption 
that his or her religion is, in fact, the only universally true one. All others are 
necessarily false. The inclusivist holds views that allow for a measure of 
universal religious truth being found in more than one particular religion, but 
that, nonetheless, it is his or her religion that fully contains, or is the full 
expression of, the universal truth. Does this suggest pluralism offers a way 
forward instead? Perhaps, but the paradigm of pluralism is no less problematic. 
 
II 
The essential idea of pluralism, as an ideological or hermeneutical response to 
the fact of plurality, is to posit a multiplicity of particular expressions of that 
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which is deemed to be universal, in opposition to the idea that there can only be 
but one legitimate – or fully valid – expression of the universal. This means, 
prima facie, that pluralism affirms the different religions as in some sense 
equally valid expressions of a universal „religious reality‟. Specific religions 
are thus viewed as co-equally valid expressions of some universal notion of 
„true religion‟. Thus both difference and equality are affirmed. Religions are 
not all the „same‟ – their differences are important; yet religions are no better 
or worse than each other as equally valid expressions of the universal. On this 
basis, no one religion can lay claim to an objective superiority, or superlative 
congruence with the universal religious reality, in respect to other religions. 
However, pluralism itself is no one thing. For example, as Byrne remarks:  
 
Some versions of the pluralist response focus on truth, affirming that all 
religions are equally true. Other versions focus on salvation, affirming 
that all religions are equally valid paths to salvation. Yet others focus on 
the notions of religious experience and encounter, affirming all religions 
to be equally good means of encountering a divine transcendent reality.
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I take this recognition of the diversity of pluralist perspectives a little further, 
however. Indeed, I suggest there are a number of discrete paradigms of 
pluralism. Some are more obvious and well known; others are somewhat novel. 
I have discussed in detail elsewhere five variants that I have identified thus 
far.
6
 Let me here simply sketch the three sub-set categories into which these 
may be grouped. 
 The first comprises the standard definitional paradigms of pluralism, 
namely Common Ground and Common Goal pluralism. These two tend to 
predominate in any discussion of religious pluralism. The first views religious 
differences, or the variety of religions, as contextualised variable expressions 
of, or from, a „Universal Source‟;  the second holds that religious differences 
reflect the variety of salvific paths leading, or drawn, to, the „Universal Goal‟. 
The fundamental ideas are clear – there is a „common ground‟ of religious 
„reality‟ from which the different religions of the world derive; or a 
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transformative „goal‟ that is the end-point of all religions, even though it may 
be differingly expressed (in concert with the narrative tradition within which 
each religion dwells uniquely) and differently attained (again in keeping with 
the unique transformative or salvific narrative of each religion). 
 The second paradigm set consists of an extreme definition of pluralism, 
namely that of Radically Differentiated pluralism which holds that religious 
differences signal an irreconcilable differentiation of religious identities. That 
is to say, there is no reasonable ground to assume a link across religions: their 
individual, particular, identities militate against any such linkage as inferred by 
the predominant paradigm-set of pluralism. What are conveniently called 
religions cannot be said to be variant examples of any single category in the 
first place. The attractiveness of this paradigm lies in its clear assertion of the 
individual identity and integrity of the religions.  
 A third sub-set of pluralism paradigms exists alongside the standard and the 
radical sets adumbrated above and, I suggest, it offers more fruitful ground for 
the sort of philosophical consideration that Byrne pursues. This is what I call 
the set of „interdependent‟ paradigms, and there are again two variants, namely 
Complementarity Holistic and Dynamic Parallel pluralism. The former holds 
that religious differences may be discerned as complementary particular 
expressions which together comprise the „Universal Whole‟. The plurality of 
religions yields the mutual complementarity of different parts together 
comprising a complex whole. The divine reality encountered and expressed 
variegatedly in and through different religions is not the One Reality behind 
religions, as it were, but the One Reality that is comprised by them all. 
 In similar fashion, Dynamic Parallel pluralism holds that religious 
differences reflect a parallelism of religious phenomena. The authenticity of 
religious phenomena is asserted without any haste to judge matters of validity 
or veracity. What then is observed as a result of analysis of presented data 
across religions is the presence of dynamic parallels of phenomena rather than 
substantive „sameness‟. Religious plurality may then be interpreted in terms of 
dynamic parallels of religious intuition and response, for example. This yields 
a point of commonality that yet preserves the integrity of difference. Religions 
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are not variants of the same thing, but they may variably express parallel 
processes. The inference is that the reality of religion lies in the dynamic 
processes rather than the veracity or otherwise of commensurable substantives. 
 
III 
In his 1995 Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism Peter Byrne aims to show that 
it is a realist perspective on religion that lies at the heart of religious pluralism.
7
  
More recently he has addressed the issue of realism in respect to Christian 
theology wherein he concludes that theology cannot be interpreted realistically, 
or at least “be sensibly conceived to be a realist discipline”.8 My interest here is 
not with the later critique of theology but Byrne‟s earlier concern with religious 
pluralism of which, in his recent work – and acknowledging the earlier – he 
states: 
 
Religious diversity yields the fact that there are world religions with 
incompatible accounts of the divine. The fact seems to face 
philosophers of religion with a choice: either find some means of 
proving one such account to be more probable than the others, or 
produce a revised account of religious truth and certainty. Philosophers 
who espouse religious pluralism despair of the first alternative and 
embrace the second. Embracing the second involves accepting 
something like this: all (or most) world religions give partial, limited 
accounts of a religious ultimate whose true nature is hidden from them.
9
 
 
This suggests that all (or most) religions refer in some degree or another – 
whether to an equal degree is another matter – to the same referent. What, then, 
is the nature of the referent? 
 Broadly speaking, realist perspectives view religions, and so religious 
language, as having an external real referent. By contrast anti-realism denies 
this in favour of a view that religion is a product of human imagining and 
shaped by human language: the referent of religion is apparent, not real. In 
relation to theology, for example, Byrne states the contrast sharply: “Can the 
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apparent intent behind talk of God to refer to an entity existing in some sense 
beyond us and the universe be taken seriously? The realist answers „yes‟ and 
the anti-realist „no‟.”10 Contemporary anti-realists such as Don Cupitt and 
Lloyd Geering, for example, follow the earlier Wittgenstein in holding that 
religious language comprises but a meaningful game. However, there is no 
„Divine Reality‟ as such that exists outside of human ken; no extra-mental 
independently existing Reality to which religion per se refers.  
 A religious fundamentalist, who tends to reflect an exclusivist mentality, 
avers just the opposite: God, or some equivalent „Divine Reality‟, not only 
exists, but is the fullness of reality itself, and is directly described by the 
scriptural text and doctrinal formularies of the religion. This is the position of 
naïve realism. Other theists may wish to take a different tack, something which 
has been referred to as critical realism, that is to say, religion does indeed refer 
to an objective reality beyond human experience and conceptual construct, but 
the relationship between this reality and human language that refers to it needs 
to be critically assessed: symbolism, metaphor, and other linguistic modalities 
and conceptual typologies apply. It is more into this context that the earlier 
work of Byrne speaks. 
 Byrne seeks to propound the plausibility of pluralism, philosophically, by 
recourse to an exposition of referential realism, and he begins by 
acknowledging religious pluralism in terms of the standard definitional set I 
described above, namely as being concerned with the postulate of a “common 
object of reference for at least many of the worlds great religions”.11 Following 
Janet Martin Soskice, Byrne asserts that it is in fact necessary for all major 
theistic traditions to refer to a common sacred, transcendent reality, and it is 
this that is at the heart of pluralism. “To distinguish itself from naturalism, 
(pluralism) must affirm that some sacred, non-human reality informs the 
religions even though no religion ever describes that reality adequately”, Byrne 
asserts.
12
 Byrne utilises the terms „sacred‟ and „transcendent‟, where the former 
evokes an evaluative category and the latter an ontological one, to denote this 
reality. 
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The sacred is that which is conceived as being of the highest possible 
value and, on some conceptions, as the source of all value in the world. 
The transcendent is an object of reference whose reality is not 
exhaustively contained within the spatio-temporal and which, in 
consequence, is crucially unlike in certain respects ordinary objects of 
reference.
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Byrne argues that there must be, as a minimal point of pluralism, at least one 
common referent held within religions and this he names as the providing of 
“real contact with a single transcendent focus”.14 This does not entail equality 
in all respects, or the vitiation of evaluative comparison either across religions 
or with reference to component elements. Setting aside the paradigm of radical 
differentiation, it would seem that Byrne‟s claim might hold. But he adds to 
this minimum  
  
the element of scepticism or agnosticism with regard to the detailed 
dogmatic or mythical structure of any specific form of faith. The 
pluralist ... on reasoned grounds, doubts whether the detailed 
dogmatics of any particular religion can be known with sufficient 
certainty to enable [that particular] faith to be the means of interpreting 
human religion. ... pluralism must take its stand on a grand negative: 
there is not the certainty in any particular religion to enable its world-
view to be the basis of a viable interpretation of religion.
15
 
 
It is this, he says, that draws a boundary between pluralism and inclusivism. 
Putting together the notion of transcendent-sacred reality together with the 
interconnecting of human existence with that reality as the route to a salvific or 
transformative resolution, and adding in a stance of “agnosticism toward, and 
therefore disengagement from, the specifics of any confessional interpretation 
of religion”, Byrne arrives at three minimal elements of religious pluralism. 
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(1) All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making 
common reference to a single transcendent, sacred reality.  
(2) All major traditions are likewise equal in respect of offering some 
means or other to human salvation.  
(3) All traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited 
accounts of the nature of the sacred: none is certain enough in its 
particular dogmatic formulations to provide the norm for interpreting 
the others.
16
 
 
So far, so good. Clearly Byrne is taking a realist perspective – religion has to 
do, philosophically speaking, with „reality‟: but of what sort? In his more 
recent work Byrne defines realism, in the context of theistic discourse, in terms 
of “the governing intent behind the concept of God … to refer to an extra-
mental, extra-mundane, transcendent entity”, but he acknowledges that “it is 
enormously difficult to attain clarity and agreement on what „transcendent 
entity‟ means”.17 For Byrne it is realism which prevents the collapse of the 
subject–object relation: realism “enforces a gap between mind and reality. It 
must, then, prevent any elision of the distinction between the human mind and 
its conceptions, on the one hand, and God on the other”.18  
 Realism holds open the door to scepticism, the antidote to religious 
gullibility.
19
 Yet realism is not to be taken as presupposing the degree of 
apodicity that the fundamentalist, for example, assumes. Says Byrne: “Realism 
is perfectly compatible with the recognition that our insight into reality is 
partial, limited and aspectival. Indeed, realism … rests on the founding 
assumption that the world is in large measure not constituted by our 
representations of it”.20 Realism in fact presupposes “that we live in a world 
which is largely ontologically and epistemically independent of us. How the 
world is is one thing; how we represent it to ourselves is another”.21 
 Pluralism, says Byrne, “shares realism with confessional interpretations of 
religion, but whereas their realism is partial (favouring some one tradition 
above others), pluralism‟s is not”.22 That is to say, “Pluralism‟s main assault on 
confessional accounts stresses the epistemological implausibilities in 
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exclusivism and inclusivism”.23 That being so, what then is Byrne‟s positive 
perspective on pluralism? He avers the importance of noting that 
 
pluralism must define its commitment to the cultural basis of religious 
thought very carefully. It cannot, on the pain of incoherence, ally itself 
to any doctrine affirming that all thought, or all religious thought, is 
through and through culturally relative or determined. It needs instead 
an account of how religious thought is culturally limited and hence 
relative to a degree.
24
 
 
Thus the notion of a transcendent referent requires capacity of thought beyond 
the culturally limited; the notion of universal perspective inherent in pluralism 
presupposes a larger vista or capacity. Pluralism is not antithetical or inimical 
to religious commitment. It does not advocate the abandonment of faith. It is, 
rather, simply sceptical as to assertions of dogmatic detail.
25
 This suggests to 
me that what I have identified as the set of interdependent paradigms of 
pluralism, in particular that of dynamic parallel pluralism, may in fact resonate 
better with Byrne‟s analysis of pluralism than the standard paradigmatic set he 
presupposes. It is the parallelism of dynamic processes rather than any equation 
of data or positing of corresponding commonalities which is of the essence. 
 Byrne indeed argues that the fact of the same referential object holding 
across different systems of thought does not of itself require there to be 
agreement as to the description of the object. Thus, for religion, the attempt to 
simply “establish a thesis of common reference for the religions need not be 
defeated by the varied list of key features which have been applied to the 
transcendent in them”.26 For example, there can be even fundamental 
differences holding “between personal and impersonal conceptions of the 
sacred” and, indeed, “further differences within each of these two families”.27 
At the same time, Byrne points out that there is “considerable overlap between 
different … descriptions of the transcendent” which can actually “bring out the 
apparent major point of agreement across many traditions that there is a 
transcendent ground of reality which is the sum and source of value”.28 In 
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regard to religion more widely, he avers that a pluralist realism is but “a matter 
of finding sufficient identifying description of the transcendent across 
traditions”.29 
 In respect to alternatives to referential realism, Byrne points out that 
descriptive-reference simply begs the question of truth and leads to a 
“dominance of one tradition over others in articulating the common truth or 
reality”.30 By contrast, pluralism must be detached from descriptive 
referentialism, or the descriptive theory of reference, “both because it does not 
provide an easy way of securing common reference in the face of cognitive 
conflicts between religions and because it promises an unfavourable account of 
the character of realism”.31 Byrne further makes the point that “if alleged 
identifying descriptions could be seen as referential not attributive, because 
they were facets of a gradual, fallible process of epistemic access to the sacred, 
divergence would not matter to the same degree”.32 This is a significant point 
and is suggestive, in my view, of the philosophical perspective that lies behind 
the dynamic parallel paradigm of pluralism, namely a phenomenological 
hermeneutic of religion wherein a distinction is made between descriptive data 
and the embedded dynamic such that the clue to the nature of what it is that the 
descriptive data refers to is indicated by the dynamic process contained within 
the narrative or action or whatever religious phenomenon that is the subject of 
attention. Thus we might say there is a two-level, or two-stage referential 
process, and any notion of the truth of the matter is found in respect to an 
analysis of the dynamics as well as the data of religion. 
 Byrne avers that “at its crudest a realist conception of religion states that 
there are real things corresponding to religious concepts”.33 Whereas the non-
realist holds there is no correspondence between common-sense concepts and 
the extra-mental existence of things corresponding to the concepts, realism 
holds there is a point of correspondence. The question is: what is the nature of 
the correspondence? For Byrne religious realism “is more properly a minimal 
realism, affirming that an extra-mental entity or state corresponds to the 
fundamental concepts of the focus of religion”.34 Thus “realism in religion 
looks as if it ought to be the view that some religious concepts genuinely 
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correspond to transcendent entities and states. Put this way it is no more, and 
no less, than the view that there is a sacred, transcendent reality”.35 Quite. But 
has the cause of arguing realism as congruent with pluralism been advanced? 
 For Byrne, a common referent can attract divergent descriptions and 
responses. This suggests more than simply variant descriptions of the one 
„thing‟, be it ultimate ground or goal. Rather it suggests religions varyingly 
refer to a real „object‟ or Reality. This is not that which is knowable directly 
through experience or observation, but indirectly, mediated through the 
responsive interactions which have formed religious narrative and discourse 
about that Reality. Thus the semantic aspect of religious realism is in the notion 
of „reference‟ rather than „truth‟. Byrne states: “It will be the idea of reference 
which establishes the cognitive contact between concepts and reality which in 
turn grounds a realist perspective on the way of thinking that embodies those 
concepts”.36 And, indeed, reference to this reality is “a material practice in 
which true description plays but a small part – contexts, methods of 
investigation and causal links between speaker and object being primary”.37 
Furthermore, in regards to what Byrne calls minimal theistic realism, he argues 
that “not all of the concepts of a mode of discourse have to be taken to be 
referential (in intent or in fact) for it to be interpreted realistically”.38 On the 
other hand, something can be “interpreted realistically although it is to a large 
extent false” and, furthermore, “strict or extensive truth in a mode of discourse 
is not a necessary condition for interpreting it realistically”.39 How is this so? 
 Byrne holds that a statement is true “because it has an objective structure, 
because the appropriate referential relations hold between its parts and reality 
and because of the independent nature of that reality”.40 Unlike the claim of 
Idealism, realism “suggests that the knower does not construct or constitute the 
thing known … so it opens the possibility that knowledge may be hard to come 
by and that many of our statements about the world may not posses strict 
truth”.41 Thus for Byrne, referential realism  
 
…allows for a middle path between, on the one hand, those who opt 
for rampant subjectivism in religion as the only means to save 
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ourselves from intolerant, authoritarian dogmatism and, on the other 
hand, those who think that strict truth must attach to the dogmas of 
some confession or other if we are not to fall into the pit of out and out 
relativism and non-cognitivism.
42
 
 
It seems to me that Byrne‟s advocacy of referential realism might resonate 
better with pluralism understood, as I have indicated above, in terms of the set 
of interdependent paradigms that involve notions of complementarity and 
dynamic parallels holding across religions. The point of comparative contact, 
then, is not a matter of substantive „sameness‟ versus „difference‟ with allied 
problems of truth and relativism. Byrne‟s discussion is limited to the extent 
that he is working within the framework of the standard predominant 
definitional set, namely Common Ground and Common Goal pluralisms. The 
assertion that “pluralism does not require all religions to offer the same 
account of salvation, merely that all religions must be alike in offering some 
means of relating salvifically to the sacred”43 is a case in point where Byrne‟s 
argument arguably implies the dynamic parallelism interpretation of pluralism. 
Admittedly, in his more recent advocacy of relativism Byrne seems to have 
moved away from his earlier positive predisposition to pluralism. He cites 
relativism as a response to religious diversity and the “confrontation with the 
fact of diverse religious conceptual schemes” as an alternate view to both 
exclusivism and pluralism. Following J. Runzo, Byrne affirms that relativism 
 
can avoid the exclusivist condemnation of rival traditions and 
conceptions of the divine. Yet it can also avoid the problems which 
come with pluralist responses to religious diversity. … Pluralist 
responses involve interpreting each religion as speaking only of an 
„image‟ of the divine, while postulating an unknown divine reality 
lying behind those images.
44
 
 
Furthermore, says Byrne, relativism  
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can close the gap between rival religious conceptual schemes and the 
divine by allowing differing sets of religious truth claims to be correct 
and each phenomenal focus to be real. Exclusivist responses to 
diversity are imperialistic. Pluralist responses are sceptical. Relativist 
responses are neither.
45
 
 
I wonder if the relativism Byrne advocates is not really a version of pluralism 
akin to the interdependent set of paradigms I have adumbrated. Byrne‟s use of 
relativism certainly contrasts with the standard paradigms I have identified, 
and it is this paradigmatic set which Byrne presumes – and now, apparently, 
rejects. Nevertheless, in my view Byrne‟s work on referential realism as the 
philosophical underpinning for religious pluralism has much to commend it. 
My contention is that referential realism, and its own corresponding pluralist 
truth-value, offers a philosophically sound framework for the comprehension 
and promotion of religious and cultural plurality as the sine qua non for human 
society in the 21
st
 century. 
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